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Wednesday, July 29, 2015
France and the UK are on the edge of Kafkaesque surveillance. Is the U.S. next?
France and the UK are on the edge of Kafkaesque surveillance. Is the U.S. Next?
Dennis Mancino HD View 360
Surveillance laws being debated around the world should avoid the recent fate of the French – and the scorn of Franz Kafka
Telecom network cables in Paris. The enactment of the ‘Big Brother’
surveillance law threatens France’s long-cherished secrecy of
communications.
Photograph: Thomas Coex/AFP/Getty Images
The problem of our laws,
wrote Kafka, is that they can involve arbitrary, secretive acts on the
part of elites. The law, on this view, has “brought only slight, more or
less accidental benefits, and done a great deal of serious harm, since
it has given the people a false sense of security towards coming events,
and left them helplessly exposed”.
“We live”, Kafka concluded, “on the razor’s edge”.
Most would find Kafka’s parable,
published in 1931, a mis-characterization of the rule of law. In
democracies with a separation of powers, there are checks and balances
between legislative, executive and judicial branches of government.
There is transparency, rigor and reason, rather than secrecy. There is
accountability and oversight.
Or so we would hope. But if ever there were a set of laws at the thin
edge of the world, reeling back the swath of advances in civil rights
and liberties during the century since Kafka resolved his thinking, and
embodying his diagnosis with terrifying precision, they are the laws surrounding surveillance and counter-terror in the digital age.
Two decisions, one 11 days ago in Britain, and another last Thursday
in France, highlight key concerns about the rule of law, cognitive
dissonance around terror, the fated pursuit of a false sense of
security, and the disassembled balance of power between citizens and the deep state.
Rory Kinnear as Josef K in the Young Vic’s production of The Trial,
Franz Kafka’s novel on the unknowability of law and the brutality of
power. Photograph: Tristram Kenton for the Guardian
Channel, chasm and gulf
The first story appears to contain a glimmer of hope. Two British
MPs, Tom Watson and David Davis, crossed the party divide and with
campaigning organization Liberty, won a legal challenge against the rushed, undemocratic Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (Dripa), passed in July 2014.
The High Court found that Dripa was unlawful
because it did not adequately ensure that access to, and use of,
communications data (though not its collection) was limited to what was
necessary, appropriate and proportionate for preventing and detecting
serious crime.
The decision has been welcomed for, finally, recognizing in the UK what a number of other countries and a slew of independent examiners
have demanded: proper judicial oversight of a “general retention regime
on a potentially massive scale”. Where it falls down, as do many of
those reports, is in accepting, implicitly or explicitly, the
euphemistic re-characterization of mass surveillance as “bulk
interception” or “bulk collection”, thus endorsing an incursion into our
private lives, papers, thoughts and communications that has no precedent in the law of the land.
Disappointingly, however, the Dripa victory is likely short-lived.
Immediately, the Home Office declared its disagreement with the High
Court’s decision, pledging to appeal. And of course, the Conservative
government has already made abundantly clear its intention to enact a
single, comprehensive law – the so-called “snooper’s charter” – which many fear would unleash a tidal wave of surveillance at political and executive discretion.
This is where the other side of the channel comes in. Late on Thursday 23 July, in France’s highest constitutional body,
the last safeguard of the rule of law fell, approving what is, by all
measures, an intrusive, comprehensive, virtually-unchecked surveillance
law.
A pipe-dream for two years, the French law gathered momentum in March this year in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attack,
and was put together in the French parliament under emergency
procedures, drastically reducing discussion time and preventing any
meaningful debate. The law was overwhelmingly approved by parliament in
June and immediately referred to the constitutional council by nearly
everyone who could do so, including François Hollande – the first time
the president has deferred a law voted by parliament in the Fifth
Republic.
The case also attracted an unheard of number of amicus briefs, many of which were made public, and most of which involved an impassioned cry about the unprecedented incursion on civil liberties that the law mandates.
And yet, despite this, the French council approved,
with very few exceptions, a law that allows intelligence agencies to
monitor phone calls and emails without prior judicial authorization; to
require internet service providers to install “black boxes” that filter
all internet traffic, combing everyone’s metadata in order to identify
deviant behaviors based on unknown parameters and provide access to the
agencies; and to bug cars, homes and keyboards for images, sound and
data.
All of this, of course, is discussed as being targeted at “suspected
terrorists”. But all of it, equally and more significantly, touches us
all; anyone and everyone who traverses the internet. The law’s goal
is to improve the agencies’ tools for a large variety of vaguely stated
purposes: terrorism, but also political surveillance, competitive
intelligence for France’s major economic, industrial and scientific
interests, the fight against organized crime, and goodness knows what
else to come.
The French case shows that the long-cherished secrecy of
communications – a notion dating at least as far back as the French
Revolution – has no constitutional priority. It shows the gripping
appeal of laws that, in Kafka’s terms, provide a false sense of security
and leave the people – particularly people in certain communities –
helplessly exposed. On Sunday 26 July, the law came into effect.
The reality is that the French and British governments have discerned
that a potent combination of public fear about extremism and political
appetite for tough national security measures have cleared the path for
draconian overreach and surveillance of all our communications. This is
enacted even without proof that such tools will prevent the unpreventable, nor any cost-benefit analysis of all of the other ways that they leave us exposed, and society fragmented.
Effective intelligence is critical to the challenges we face. But that intelligence must be targeted, and it must be subject to due process, transparency and meaningful independent oversight.
Measures that inhibit all of our freedoms must be subject to open,
fair, evidenced-based debate, rather than cynical emergency procedures.
And even if an individual is prepared to surrender all privacy in order
to accept a minute reduction in risk of a catastrophic event, what
safeguards are in place to prevent even greater catastrophes, in the
hands of a state, oft-captured and oft-brutal, knowing and seeing all?
The tools that France
and Britain are currently seeking are too blunt and intrusive for
modern democracies. They stifle dissent with the same chilling turn
uttered by Robespierre, one of the main leaders of the Reign of Terror
during the French Revolution in condemning his former friend and close
ally Danton to the guillotine for alleged counter-revolutionary
activities: “anyone who trembles at this moment is guilty; for innocence
never fears public surveillance”.
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